Carolina Convenience Stores, Inc. v. City of Spartanburg Even though plaintiff’s store was damaged while the defendant-city’s police rescued a hostage from her kidnapper, this was an exercise of the city’s police power and not its power of eminent domain. Therefore, plaintiff failed to make out an inverse condemnation claim against the city.
We affirm summary judgment for the city.
Hardwick v. Heyward Since all but one of the plaintiff-student’s “protest” t-shirts included depictions of the Confederate flag, most of the shirts could be prohibited without violating the student’s First Amendment rights as decided by this court in its Sept. 8, 2009 order. The final shirt at issue, which depicted the U.S. flag and the words “Old Glory Flew over legalized slavery for 90 years!” could be banned from public school as “plainly offensive.”
South Carolinians for Responsible Government v. Krawcheck S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-1300(6)’s definition of “committee” potentially subjects a group to the statutory burdens of a “committee” based on a single $500 transaction, regardless of whether the transaction was relevant to the organization’s “major purpose” or the $500 expenditure constituted a meaningful portion of the group’s disbursements. Therefore, the definition of “committee” is overbroad and facially unconstitutional.
Occupy Columbia v. Haley Plaintiffs are likely to establish that Occupy Columbia’s camping on the State House grounds is expressive conduct, and defendants’ unwritten and ever-changing “conditions” for such an encampment are not valid time, place and manner restrictions.
Defendants are preliminarily enjoined from interfering with plaintiffs’ 24-hour occupation of the State House grounds, including sleeping on the grounds and the use of sleeping bags and tents.
McMaster v. Columbia Board of Zoning Appeals There is a rational relationship between the defendant-city’s decision to limit to three the number of unrelated individuals who may live together as a single housekeeping unit and the legitimate governmental interests of controlling the undesirable qualities associated with mass student congestion. The city’s ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the S.C. Constitution.
We affirm the circuit court decision to uphold the ordinance.
U.S. v. Guijon-Ortiz A police officer who questioned a pickup passenger’s alien legal residence card during a routine traffic stop did not violate the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights when he extended the stop to call the local customs office to check the validity of the passenger’s identification, and the 4th Circuit affirms defendant passenger’s conviction for illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
Anderson v. City of Camden Even though privately owned dogs are “effects” subject to the protection of the Fourth Amendment, the law surrounding the state’s right to seize aggressive dogs is too murky to allow the court to say defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right when they seized plaintiffs’ German Shepherds.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.
Squirewell v. South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation Although plaintiff asserts that he was denied procedural due process, he did not take advantage of existing procedures; that is, after his contractor’s license was revoked, plaintiff did not appeal to the Administrative Law Court. Plaintiff’s failure to use available post-deprivation procedures defeats his procedural due process claim.
Summary judgment for defendants.
Norman v. Frederick The facts show that defendant Hamlett did not strike plaintiff during his arrest, so Hamlett is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s excessive force claim; however, Hamlett may be liable on plaintiff’s bystander claim.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
Board of Trustees v. State In order to override the governor’s veto, not only must there be a quorum present in each house of the General Assembly, but there must also be a vote by two-thirds of the members present to override the veto. Since 120 representatives were present in the House of Representatives, a vote of 33 to 10 was insufficient to override the governor’s veto of Act 308 of the S.C. Acts of 2010. Since there was a quorum present in the Senate, a vote of 1 to 0 was insufficient to override the veto.
In our original jurisdiction, we enter judgment for the plaintiff-board of trustees.
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