Way v. Way The parties’ marital estate was comprised mainly of debt; in fact, the marital home was so encumbered by mortgages that it had a negative value. The most substantial positively valued assets were the parties’ vehicles: the husband’s truck was valued at $1,885 and the wife’s car was valued at either $4,590 or $5,100.
Anthony H. v. Matthew G. Where Georgia still has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), the family court lacked jurisdiction to hear this action to terminate the father’s parental rights so the child’s step-father could adopt her.
McLeod v. Starnes We overturn Webb v. Sowell, 387 S.C. 328, 692 S.E.2d 543 (2010), and return to the law as it existed prior to Webb: a trial court may order a non-custodial parent to pay his child’s college expenses even after the
Crossland v. Crossland Although the defendant-wife testified at the divorce hearing that she was eligible for Social Security benefits but had not applied for them, there is no evidence in the record that the family court considered the wife’s eligibility for Social Security benefits when it decided to award her alimony of $958.50 per month.
Hines v. Hines Even though the family court erred by failing to make findings of fact to support its custody award, the record is sufficient to show that, despite his anger issues, the father is better suited to have custody of the children.
Chisholm v. Chisholm On a prior appeal, the Court of Appeals awarded the plaintiff-husband more visitation with the parties’ son and remanded the family court’s award of attorney’s fees to the defendant-wife for reconsideration based on the beneficial result of the husband’s appeal. On remand, the trial court did just that and reduced the amount of its attorney’s fee award to the wife. In the present appeal, the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the attorney’s fee award in its entirety.
Fuller v. Fuller On a husband’s motion to reduce his alimony obligation, the family court refused to consider any factor other than the husband’s age (67). The family court erred by failing to consider other factors.
Mullarkey v. Mullarkey Where the defendant-husband continued serving in the Navy after the parties’ separation and divorce, he was entitled to have the family court recalculate the percentage of his military retirement benefits to which the plaintiff-wife was entitled under the parties’ property division.
Sanders v. Sanders Where the plaintiff-wife placed her inheritance into an account that she used to pay marital expenses, this evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the wife’s inheritance was transmuted into marital property.
We affirm the trial court’s inclusion of the wife’s AG Edwards account as a marital asset, the valuation of the marital residence, and the equal division of the parties’ marital assets. We reverse and remand the trial court’s use of different dates for valuing the parties’ retirement accounts. We also remand for further proceedings regarding the disposition of items 178-237 on the wife’s Schedule A.
Williams v. Williams Where the plaintiff-father stipulated to the entry of a qualified medical child support order, the family court erred in refusing to issue one. Our research has revealed nothing to support the family court’s reliance on the father’s fulfillment of his obligation under the current order as a basis for denying the defendant-mother’s request for a QMCSO.
Reversed and remanded.
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