Criminal Practice – Death Penalty – Waiver of Review – Defendant’s Competency

State v. Motts. (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-045-11, 11 pp.) (Donald W. Beatty, J.) Appealed from Greenville County Circuit Court. (Larry R. Patterson & D. Garrison Hill, JJ.) S.C. S. Ct. Click here for the full text of the opinion.

Holding: Defendant is competent to waive appellate review, and he will be presumed competent unless he seeks post-conviction review on the basis of competency.

Although defendant may waive his personal right to appellate review, he cannot waive this court’s statutorily imposed duty to review his capital sentence. Having conducted such review, we find the sentence of death was not the result of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, and the jury’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance for the murder is supported by the evidence. Nor is the sentence disproportionate.

Competency

Three court-appointed examiners unanimously agreed that defendant met the competency standard set out in Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 75, 437 S.E.2d 53 (1993). In their written report, the experts found that defendant understood a jury had convicted him for the death of his cellmate and that a judge had sentenced him to death.

According to the experts, defendant also “verbalized a basic understanding” of the appellate process and post-conviction review (PCR). The experts further opined that defendant “possesses sufficient capacity or ability to rationally communicate with counsel.”

Despite defendant’s lifelong mental health issues, the experts concluded that he “is not evidencing current symptoms of mental illness or other deficits that would significantly compromise his present capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings, the reason or nature of the punishment, or his ability to rationally communicate with counsel.”

Although defendant experienced bouts of major depression, Dr. Frierson found that he was currently in “full remission.” Neither Dr. Frierson nor Dr. Salas believed that defendant’s decision to waive his direct appeal was a product of depression or that it constituted a desire to commit suicide.

At the competency hearing, Frierson and Salas testified that their opinion regarding defendant’s competency had not changed even after interviewing him the day of the hearing. Frierson and Salas also informed Judge Hill that the medications defendant was currently taking did not affect his cognitive abilities.

Judge Hill and this court also thoroughly questioned defendant. In response to these questions, defendant was able to articulate his understanding of his murder conviction and death sentence, the competency proceedings, the appellate proceedings, and the PCR proceedings. Defendant also stated that he deserved the death penalty and explained that he did not want to remain incarcerated for the next 30 to 40 years. Finally, defendant explained that he was firm in his commitment to waive his appeals and that no one had threatened or coerced him to reach this decision.

Waiver

Having affirmed Judge Hill’s ruling, the next step in our analysis is to review defendant’s sentence of death.

Because there is a conflict in our jurisprudence as to whether a capital defendant may waive this court’s review of his sentence, we take this opportunity to definitively resolve this issue.

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-25, the provision that addresses capital-sentencing proceedings, provides in pertinent part, “The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal, if taken, and the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall render its decision on all legal errors, the factual substantiation of the verdict, and the validity of the sentence.”

As we interpret § 16-3-25, the General Assembly contemplated a defendant’s waiver of a direct appeal; however, it made no such provision as to this court’s mandatory sentence review. Although defendant is entitled to waive his personal right to a direct appeal, we hold that he cannot waive this court’s statutorily imposed duty to review his capital sentence.

After reviewing the entire record, we find the sentence of death was not the result of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, and the jury’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance for the murder is supported by the evidence. Furthermore, a review of prior cases establishes that the death sentence in this case is proportionate to that in similar cases and is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the crime.

Last-Minute Examination

After careful consideration, we find that neither the circuit court nor this court is required to issue an order for a court-appointed psychiatrist to interview defendant, in the absence of some indicia of incompetency, immediately prior to his execution to assure that he has remained competent.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the state from executing an incompetent individual.

There is a presumption of continued competency once a judicial determination of a defendant’s competency has been established.

Although State v. Drayton, 270 S.C. 582, 243 S.E.2d 458 (1978), involved a determination of a defendant’s competency to stand trial, we believe it provides guidance in the instant case regarding defendant’s competency to be executed.

Because this court is responsible for the final determination of an inmate’s competency to be executed, it has consistently questioned each inmate personally with respect to his continued competency and decision to waive any further appellate proceedings regarding their conviction and capital sentence.

If the court determines that the inmate is competent, it can affirm the circuit court’s ruling and order that the inmate’s execution be carried out in accordance with S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-370, which provides that a death sentence be carried out on the fourth Friday after the commissioner of the prison system is notified of the final disposition. Thus, there is a relatively short delay between the court’s determination that an inmate is competent to be executed and the actual date of execution.

In the event an inmate alleges he is incompetent after an order of execution is issued by this court, the inmate may apply for PCR on the basis of competency, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(a)(6). Subsequently, an evidentiary hearing would be held at which the inmate would be required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he lacks the requisite competency for execution.

If the PCR court finds the applicant incompetent, and this court agrees, a stay of execution would be issued. If the inmate becomes competent, then the state would have to move for a hearing before the PCR judge in order to lift the stay of execution.

Additionally, if the court has reason to believe that the inmate is incompetent, it can then issue a stay of execution pursuant to a “Singleton writ.”

Whether the competency determination is made in the week or the month before the prisoner’s scheduled execution, the state is entitled to exercise discretion in creating its own procedures “as long as basic fairness is observed.” Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).

Based on the foregoing, we believe this court’s procedures concerning an inmate’s competency to be executed comply with the intent of Ford. By remanding to the circuit court for a competency hearing, this court acquires an extensive evidentiary record regarding an inmate’s mental-health history as well as a judicial determination as to an inmate’s competency. If the court then personally questions an inmate, it is able to evaluate an inmate’s competency shortly before the execution date. In the event an inmate becomes incompetent prior to execution, there is a PCR avenue available that could potentially result in a stay of execution.

In conclusion, we affirm the circuit court’s decision finding defendant competent to waive his direct appeal and that this waiver is knowing and voluntary. After conducting our statutorily imposed duty to review defendant’s capital sentence, we also affirm the sentence of death. Finally, given this court’s procedures and the PCR avenues available to defendant, we conclude that neither the circuit court nor this court is required to order that a court-appointed psychiatrist interview defendant immediately prior to his execution in the absence of some indicia of incompetency.

Affirmed.