Tort/Negligence — Traffic Accident – Stopped School Bus – Second Car Behind – Left Turn

Singleton v. Cuthbert (Lawyers Weekly No. 011-064-16, 5 pp.) (Stephanie McDonald, J.) (Paul Short Jr., J., dissenting) Appealed from Beaufort County Circuit Court (J. Ernest Kinard Jr., J.) S.C. App.

Holding: Where plaintiff was in the second car behind a stopped school bus, she was neither passing nor overtaking the bus when she made a left turn into her mother’s driveway. Therefore, the trial court erred in directing a verdict that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law under S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2770(A).

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Section 56-5-2770(A) provides, “The driver of a vehicle meeting or overtaking from either direction a school bus stopped on a highway or private road must stop before reaching the bus where there are in operation on the bus flashing red lights …, and the driver must not proceed until the bus resumes motion or the flashing red lights are no longer actuated.”

On the motion of defendant (who, coming from the opposite direction, continued past the stopped school bus and struck plaintiff), the trial court granted a directed verdict, finding plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law for admittedly turning left behind the vehicle stopped behind a bus with flashing caution lights. Plaintiff admitted the school bus’s flashing red lights were on, the bus was stopped, she came to a stop, and then she proceeded to turn left into the driveway while the bus was still stopped. She assigns error, however, to the circuit court’s interpretation of “meeting and overtaking” under § 56-5-2770(A).

Plaintiff stopped and turned before she reached the bus. She was not passing, seeking to pass, or catching up to the bus.

The trial court instructed the jury that it had ruled that plaintiff “violated that statute … because she was in close proximity to the bus …,” thus expanding the operation of § 56-5-2770(A) to encompass not only those “meeting or overtaking” vehicles, but also those “in close proximity to” a school bus. While this would certainly be reasonable behavior for a driver (and perhaps relevant to the consideration of due care), it is not mandated by the plain language of § 56-5-2770(A). Thus, to the extent this statute is even applicable to the current situation, whether plaintiff was negligent is a factual issue that should have been determined by the jury.

Reversed and remanded.

Dissent

(Short, J.) Plaintiff came to a stop behind the school bus, but she turned left while the bus was still stopped. By her own testimony and the clear language of the statute, she was in violation of § 56-5-2770(A).