COA grants immunity in Myrtle Beach ‘stand-your-ground’ shooting

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Sufficient evidence supported findings that the shooting was justified under the state’s Protections of Persons and Property Act, the South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled, affirming a trial court’s decision granting immunity from prosecution to a defendant charged with murder after a fatal shooting in a Myrtle Beach apartment-complex parking lot.

The court rejected the state’s arguments that the defendant provoked the confrontation, lacked a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, or was engaged in unlawful activity at the time of the shooting.

The case arose from a volatile dispute between Anijah Yarnell and his girlfriend, Remington Hargrove, in May 2020. Following a day of arguments and repeated phone calls, Yarnell drove to an apartment complex where Hargrove and her family were staying. Yarnell maintained that he went there to return her belongings after she told him she intended to move out. Later that evening, he encountered Michael Pennington, the boyfriend of Hargrove’s cousin, in the parking lot. During the confrontation, Yarnell shot Pennington through the partially lowered driver’s-side window of his vehicle, killing him.

A grand jury subsequently indicted Yarnell for murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Before trial, however, he sought immunity under South Carolina’s stand-your-ground statute, arguing that he acted in self-defense. Following an evidentiary hearing that included testimony from numerous witnesses, the circuit court found Yarnell credible and concluded that he established the elements necessary to justify the use of deadly force.

On appeal, the state argued that Yarnell’s conduct throughout the day, including repeatedly calling Hargrove, sending hostile messages, and appearing at the apartment complex, showed he was responsible for creating the confrontation. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that the trial court was entitled to credit Yarnell’s testimony that he came to deliver Hargrove’s belongings and that Pennington escalated the encounter by approaching the vehicle, threatening him, attempting to open the car door, and reaching into the vehicle. Because appellate courts defer heavily to credibility findings supported by evidence, the panel declined to disturb the trial court’s conclusions.

The court also upheld findings that Yarnell reasonably feared death or serious bodily injury. According to testimony accepted by the trial court, Pennington attempted to force his way into the vehicle, punched Yarnell through the window, and reached toward the firearm after Yarnell displayed it. Those facts supported the conclusion that Yarnell believed he was in imminent danger and justified the use of deadly force.

In addition, the court held that Yarnell was entitled to the statutory presumption of reasonable fear because evidence showed Pennington was attempting to unlawfully and forcibly enter an occupied vehicle. The panel further rejected the state’s contention that Yarnell was engaged in unlawful activity that would disqualify him from immunity, finding evidence supported the conclusion that he had been permitted to enter the apartment complex to return Hargrove’s belongings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order granting immunity and barring further prosecution.

The State v. Yarnell (Lawyers Weekly No. 012-029-26, 12 pp.) (Per Curiam) Appealed from Horry County Circuit Court (J. Mark Hayes, II, J.) Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of Conway, all for Appellant. Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Respondent. South Carolina Court of Appeals Unpublished