Constitutional – Councilman’s Suspension – Moral Turpitude – Domestic Violence – Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Separation of Powers

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When the plaintiff-city councilman was charged with second-degree domestic violence, S.C. Const. art. VI, § 8 gave the governor the authority to suspend plaintiff until he was acquitted.

We affirm the circuit court’s ruling as modified.

Under S.C. Const. art. VI, § 8, when an elected official is charged with a crime involving moral turpitude, the governor may suspend the official until he is acquitted.

Although plaintiff’s suspension and term of office have both ended, we decline to dismiss this appeal as moot. The appeal concerns issues that are capable of repetition, yet evading review. Plaintiff’s suspension, even if appropriate, resulted in a period of approximately 18 months where the residents of District 3 had no representation on the Columbia City Council, so bringing clarity to the questions before the court is highly desirable for all concerned.

The subject matter of this declaratory judgment action concerns the governor’s suspension power under the South Carolina Constitution. The circuit court was asked to make legal determinations: whether plaintiff qualifies as a member of the Legislative Branch and whether the offense at issue qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. These legal questions involve interpretation of the constitution to determine the extent of the governor’s suspension power, a subject that is appropriate for judicial determination. The circuit court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

The governor’s authority to suspend elected officials does not extend to the judicial or legislative branches of the government. However, plaintiff’s membership in a local legislative body does not make him a member of the “Legislative Branch,” as that term is used in our constitution. Our review of constitutional provisions convinces us that the framers’ reference to the “Legislative Branch” was intended to refer to the General Assembly. Accordingly, the circuit court correctly found that plaintiff was not a member of the Legislative Branch and so was not excepted from the governor’s suspension power.

The circuit erred by failing to determine whether plaintiff had been charged with a crime involving moral turpitude. While the governor’s exercise of his suspension power is a matter left to his sole discretion, the interpretation of the constitution, including defining the meaning of its terms, is a matter for the courts.

In South Carolina, a crime involving moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general. South Carolina courts have held that whether some offenses are crimes involving moral turpitude depends on the nature of the crime as defined by law as well as the particularized facts contained in the indictment.

The indictment charging plaintiff with second-degree domestic violence alleged, in relevant part, that he “did … cause physical harm or injury to a household member, [his spouse], or did offer or attempt to cause physical harm or injury … with apparent present ability under circumstances reasonably creating fear of imminent peril by striking [his spouse] with a car door[,] an act likely to result in moderate bodily injury.”

There can be no doubt that domestic violence is an affront to the fundamental sanctity of the home and society. Accordingly, we find that domestic violence, with its inherent violation of a special relationship, can qualify as a crime of moral turpitude.

Under the circumstances presented here, in which it is alleged that an individual engaged in conduct that was likely to result in moderate bodily injury, we conclude the charge of second-degree domestic violence qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. Because plaintiff’s indictment charged a crime involving moral turpitude, the governor had the constitutional authority to issue an executive order suspending plaintiff from his position as a member of the Columbia City Council.

Affirmed as modified.

Baddourah v. McMaster (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-008-21, 21 pp.) (Donald Beatty, C.J.) Appealed from the Circuit Court in Richland County (Thomas Cooper, J.) Tobias Ward, Derrick Jackson, Joseph McCulloch and Kathy Schillaci for appellant; Thomas Limehouse for respondent. S.C. S. Ct.