Constitutional – Wrongful Termination – Defamation – Public Official – Limited Public Figure – Damages Award

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Although petitioner was a public employee and enjoyed media attention akin to that of many sports figures, that does not transform him into a public official.

We reversed the decision of the court of appeals and held petitioner was not a public official or a limited public figure.

Petitioner Jeffrey L. Cruce became the head football coach and athletic director for Berkeley High School in 2011. For the 2015 season, he adopted a controversial “no punt” offensive scheme for the football team. This strategy stirred intense debate among followers of the team and was covered in local and even national sports pages. The controversy deepened as the team suffered lopsided defeats. In December 2015, the Deputy Superintendent of the Berkeley County School District sent petitioner a letter advising him he was being relieved as coach and athletic director and reassigned to a position as a middle school guidance counselor because he had failed to meet certain performance goals. The District never revealed the reason for petitioner’s reassignment to the public. Petitioner requested the District reconsider his reassignment.

On January 7, 2016, Berkeley High athletic trainer Chris Stevens sent an email to 45 people, including administrators, athletic department employees, and volunteer coaches, questioning the integrity and completeness of student athlete files petitioner had maintained. In the email, Stevens remarked the filing issues were a potential “liability” to the District.

Petitioner later brought this lawsuit against the District, alleging wrongful termination and defamation. The trial court granted the District a directed verdict on petitioner’s wrongful termination claim. The trial court also granted the District a directed verdict as to his defamation claim, except the portion of the claim related to Stevens’ email. In sending the defamation claim based on Stevens’ email to the jury, the trial court rejected the District’s contention that Cruce was required to prove actual malice, ruling Cruce was not a public figure. The jury awarded petitioner $200,000 in actual damages. The District appealed. The court of appeals reversed, holding petitioner was a public official for purposes of defamation law and the District was therefore entitled to immunity because §15-78-60(17) of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (2005) (SCTCA) immunizes the District from losses caused by employee conduct amounting to “actual malice.” We granted petitioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari to address the issue of whether he was a public official or public figure.

According to the court of appeals, petitioner was a public official due to his status as a high school football coach and athletic director. If deemed a public official, petitioner would be required to prove constitutional actual malice as articulated by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), to prevail on his defamation claim, and that requirement inherently bars his claim because the SCTCA grants the District immunity from loss arising from employee conduct constituting actual malice. § 15-78-60(17).

We understand petitioner was a public employee and enjoyed media attention akin to that of many sports figures. But that does not transform him into a public official, a classification that would strip him of his right to protect his name from being defamed to the same extent as a private citizen. No matter how intense the public gaze may be upon sports figures, they do not have any official influence or decision-making authority about serious issues of public policy or core government functions, such as defense, public health and safety, budgeting, infrastructure, taxation, or law and order.

We therefore held petitioner was not a public official. Consequently, we reversed the decision of the court of appeals. In fairness, the court of appeals’ conclusion that petitioner was a public official understandably relied on Garrard v. Charleston County School District., which held a high school football coach was a public official. We have since vacated that portion of Garrard. We also concluded petitioner is not a limited public figure. First, no public controversy was present. The merit of petitioner’s coaching strategy was not a controversy that affected large segments of society. Second, even if a public controversy existed over petitioner’s coaching strategy, Stevens’ defamatory comments related to petitioner’s paperwork skills, not his gridiron acumen.

The jury’s general verdict found the email defamed petitioner. Implicit in that finding is the recognition that the email damaged petitioner’s reputation. There was enough evidence to support the jury’s further implicit findings as to proximate cause and the damages amount.

Reversed.

Cruce v. Berkeley County School District (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 010-003-24, 15 pp.) (D. Garrison Hill, J.) Lucy Clark Sanders and Nancy Bloodgood, both of Bloodgood & Sanders, LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, for petitioner; E. Brandon Gaskins, of Moore & Van Allen, PLLC, of Charleston; Richard J. Morgan, of Burr & Forman LLP, of Columbia; and Andrew F. Lindemann, of Lindemann Law Firm, P.A., of Columbia, all for respondent. South Carolina Supreme Court