Criminal Practice – Sentencing Guidelines – Two-Level Leadership Adjustment

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We discerned no error in the district court’s application of the two-level leadership adjustment in this case.

We affirmed the conviction and aggregate 600-month sentence.

Brandon Lloyd Daniels appealed his convictions and the aggregate 600-month sentence imposed following both a bench trial, which related to two of the six counts charged in the underlying second superseding indictment, and a jury trial on the remaining four counts. The district court found Daniels guilty of possession of a sawed-off shotgun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), 5871 (Count 1), and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e) (Count 2). The jury later convicted Daniels of three of the four remaining counts, including substantive Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Count 4); discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, to wit: the Hobbs Act robbery charged in Count 4, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (Count 5); and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e) (Count 6).

On appeal, counsel for Daniels filed a brief concluding there were no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning the district court’s calculation of Daniels’ Sentencing Guidelines range as to two of the upward adjustments to his base offense level. Daniels filed a pro se supplemental brief, raising several additional issues, including a facial challenge to his § 922(g) convictions based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Because of this argument, we initially held this appeal in abeyance for our decision in United States v. Canada, 103 F.4th 257 (4th Cir. 2024), which was issued in June 2024. In September 2024, we ordered counsel for Daniels to submit a supplemental Anders brief addressing other issues, which he did. Daniels submitted a second pro se supplemental brief identifying two new arguments for review. In the interim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded Canada to this court for further consideration in light of United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). On December 6, 2024, we re-issued and re-adopted the initial decision in Canada, as modified, which rendered this case again ripe for disposition. We discerned no error in the district court’s application of the two-level leadership adjustment in this case.

We fully considered the district court’s sentencing analysis and discerned no potentially meritorious sentencing issues that warrant further consideration. That is, the district court properly calculated both the total adjusted offense level applicable to the highest grouped counts, as well as Daniels’ criminal history score, and opted to run the imposed sentences consecutively, as authorized by USSG § 5G1.2(d), to effectuate the total punishment of 360 months to life in prison. Moreover, the court offered a robust explanation for the selected sentence that was tethered to the § 3553(a) factors. Finally, the court considered but rejected the mitigation arguments proffered by defense counsel, finding them inadequate to undermine the severity and depravity of the offense conduct. Accordingly, we affirmed the aggregate 600-month sentence.

We turned to the remaining arguments raised in Daniels’ pro se supplemental briefs, which (a) challenged the jury instructions related to Count 4 and the constitutionality of his § 922(g) convictions; and (b) sought to demonstrate reversible error based on Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). Daniels maintained there was a constructive amendment to the indictment, and a resulting fatal variance, because Count 4 charged Daniels both as a principal and under a theory of aiding and abetting but the jury was not instructed as to the latter. While Daniels is factually correct, this does not amount to a fatal variance.

Finally, this brought us to the last issue raised in Daniels’ second pro se supplemental brief, that the jury should have made a factual finding as to whether he had a prior qualifying felony conviction to support the § 922(g) charges. But whether Daniels had a qualifying prior felony conviction was an element of the § 922(g) charges, and Daniels stipulated to his felon status at both the bench and jury trials. Thus, the court quite rightly did not charge the jury with deciding if the Government’s evidence satisfied this element of the § 922(g) charges. The record clearly shows that, although Daniels was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), he did not have the predicate convictions needed to trigger the increase in his statutory sentencing range.

Affirmed.

United States v. Brandon Lloyd Daniels (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 003-011-25, 13 pp.) (Per Curiam) Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston (Bruce H. Hendricks, J.) On Brief: William W. Watkins, Sr., William W. Watkins, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant; Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Unpublished