Tort/Negligence – Punitive Damages – Directed Verdict

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The trial court erred by granting GCA Services Group, Inc.’s motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages because a jury could reasonably have found by clear and convincing evidence that a GCA employee and GCA acted recklessly.

We affirmed reversal of the trial court’s ruling granting a directed verdict on punitive damages and remanded to the court of appeals.

Karrie Gurwood filed this lawsuit against GCA Services Group, Inc., on Karrie’s negligence claim after Karrie slipped and fell on a floor recently waxed by GCA employee Bonnie Every at Karrie’s workplace. At trial, the trial court granted GCA’s motion for a directed verdict as to punitive damages. The jury then found Karrie and GCA were each 50% at fault and awarded Karrie the exact amount of her past medical expenses.

Karrie appealed on six grounds, including her contention the trial court erred by granting GCA a directed verdict as to punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed the directed verdict on punitive damages, found its reversal on that issue to be “dispositive” of the appeal, and remanded for a new trial. We affirmed reversal of the directed verdict. However, we modified the remand instructions because we held that requiring GCA to face a retrial on all issues would be contrary to law.

At the conclusion of Karrie’s presentation of evidence, GCA moved for a directed verdict on punitive damages, arguing there was “no evidence . . . that would support a jury’s finding of . . . reckless conduct.” Instead, GCA argued, the evidence “establishes at least some level of care on the part of Mrs. Every and would preclude a finding of punitive damages in this case.” GCA further argued “conduct that would justify the imposition of punitive damages has to be extreme. And there is just no evidence of that in this case.” The trial court granted GCA’s motion, stating the reckless “conduct of the at-fault party must be proven by clear and convincing evidence” and “punitive damages would not be appropriate.” The trial court further explained, “based upon my analysis of all the case law over all the years . . . this case does not rise to the level that a charge on punitive damages would be warranted.” The jury found GCA was negligent, Karrie was 50% at fault, and Karrie suffered damages in the amount of $170,629.10—the exact cost of her past medical expenses. Apparently, the jury did not include in its actual damages award the other elements trial counsel asked for in his closing argument, including lost wages, pain and suffering, future medical expenses, and loss of enjoyment of life. The jury also found for GCA on Howard’s loss of consortium claim. Because the jury found Karrie 50% at fault, the trial court reduced her award to $85,314.55.

The central issue before us was whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant the trial court submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury. This case was about whether GCA or Every was “reckless.” The trial court appears to have recognized that it must incorporate the clear and convincing evidence standard into its analysis of defendant’s directed verdict motion as to punitive damages. On this point, the trial court did not err.

We disagreed, however with the trial court’s conclusion from that analysis. We found the evidence presented could reasonably support a jury verdict that Karrie proved by clear and convincing evidence Every or GCA was reckless. Thus, the trial court erred by granting GCA’s motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages because a jury could reasonably have found by clear and convincing evidence that Every and GCA acted recklessly.

GCA specifically asked the court of appeals not to remand for a new trial on all issues. Additionally, it is now impossible—five years after the original jury verdict—for the same jury that already determined actual damages to hear the remanded punitive damages claim. Nevertheless, subsection 15-32-520(A) grants defendant the power to insist upon the same jury hearing actual and punitive damages. Because GCA essentially prevailed before the jury in the original trial, and considering GCA’s request to the court of appeals that it not remand for a new trial on all issues, we seriously doubt GCA will invoke its subsection 15-32-520(A) right to “request[]” the trial of actual and punitive damages “before the same jury.” If GCA does make that request, however, then subsection 15-32-520(A) requires the request be granted. Because impaneling the same jury is now impossible, the only feasible way to grant that request as required by subsection 15-32-520(A) is to order a new trial on all issues. If GCA does not make the subsection 15-32-520(A) request, then the trial court should proceed to conduct a new trial only on the issue of punitive damages.

Affirmed as modified.

Gurwood v. GCA Services Group Inc. (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 010-018-25, 14 pp.) (John C. Few, J.) Appealed from Charleston County Circuit Court (Alex Kinlaw Jr., J.) Robert T. Lyles Jr., of Lyles & Associates, LLC, of Mount Pleasant, for Petitioners; Karrie Gurwood and Howard Gurwood, pro se, of Charleston, Respondents. South Carolina Supreme Court