Tort/Negligence – Grossly Excessive Damages Award – Comparable Cases

Listen to this article

The $30 million default judgment was grossly excessive.

We affirmed on all grounds except the amount of the award. We reverse the award judgment and remanded.

This was an appeal in a wrongful death case. Marlayna Joan Carwile was three years old when she tragically died while crossing the road between her neighbors’ house and her parents’ house in rural Darlington County. Her mother, acting in her individual capacity and as representative of Marlayna’s estate, sued the neighbors, the Andersons, alleging they failed to properly supervise the child. The case came to us after two entries of default and a default judgment. The first default resulted from the Andersons’ failure to respond after being served with the lawsuit. The circuit court set this default aside based on an affidavit explaining the Andersons had promptly notified two insurance companies of the suit and hired private counsel after those companies denied coverage and after notice of the default. The Andersons were permitted to file an answer, but after that, the Andersons and their counsel did virtually nothing to participate in the litigation. They did not respond to discovery requests other than some requests for admission; they did not respond to inquiries from opposing counsel; they did not respond to a motion to compel discovery; and they did not respond to a motion for sanctions. Because of this, the circuit court struck the Andersons’ answer, and the Andersons were put in default for a second time. The case was referred to a special referee. At that point, a new lawyer appeared for the Andersons and requested the second default be set aside. The referee denied the motion, and after a hearing on damages, entered a $30 million default judgment to be split evenly between Marlayna’s parents. The referee denied the Andersons’ motions to reconsider the default judgment or set it aside.

The Andersons made several arguments on appeal. They contended that the circuit court erred in striking their answer and allowing the second entry of default; the special referee lacked authority to hear this case; the second default should have been set aside; the special referee considered improper evidence in making his damages award; and the damages award is grossly excessive.

After a review of the evidence and record, we held, among other things, that the $30 million judgment in this case was grossly excessive. Although we understand the intangible damages suffered here cannot be “determined by any fixed measure,” and that no amount of money can fully compensate this family for the loss they have suffered, we could not conclude “there is any margin for a reasonable difference of opinion” in our decision that the $30 million judgment in this case is excessive. Our decision is bolstered by comparing this judgment to judgments in similar cases. We fully recognize that a comparison analysis is not required and that no two cases are identical. Even so, precedent explains that comparing judgments can be useful when reviewing judgments for excessiveness, and several cases in this area have used that approach. A proper comparison analysis is particularly instructive in this case because the difficult task of valuing these damages was not undertaken by a jury, but fell on the shoulders of one lawyer acting as a special referee. Many of the cases in this area speak of the substantial deference afforded to the jury’s assessment of damages. We expect part of the reason for this deference, if not the main reason, is because of the important role the jury plays in the civil justice system. The record contains a suggestion that a comparison analysis was not useful because so few cases go through a full trial and appeal. As we see it, that point cuts in precisely the opposite direction.

Throughout this case, the Andersons have proposed that verdicts in comparable cases, accounting for inflation, range from between $230,000 to $6 million. It does not appear anyone disputes the accuracy of these computations. The referee answered this argument by pointing to other cases with larger judgments, but even those cases do not alter our conclusion that a judgment of $30 million is grossly excessive in this case. We fully expect the judgment in this case to be substantial, and we note that nothing in this opinion should be taken as suggesting the judgment must fall within the range established by similar cases. However, when we consider the evidence and the fact that the $30 million judgment here is so greatly different from comparable cases, we could only conclude that this judgment is grossly excessive.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Carwile v. Anderson (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 012-025-25, 9 pp.) (Per Curiam) Appealed from Darlington County Circuit Court (Paul M. Burch, J. and Patrick James McLaughlin, Special Referee) James Bernard Hood, of Hood Law Firm, LLC, of Charleston; Andrew James MacLeod, of Willson Jones Carter & Baxley, P.A., of Columbia; and Deborah Harrison Sheffield, of Columbia, all for Appellants; David Butler Yarborough, Jr., Douglas Edmund Jennings, and Reynolds H. Blankenship, Jr., all of Yarborough Applegate, LLC, of Charleston; Kathleen Chewning Barnes, of Barnes Law Firm, LLC, of Hampton; and Ryan Christopher Andrews, of Law Office of Ryan C. Andrews LLC, of Charleston, all for Respondent. South Carolina Court of Appeals Unpublished