Labor & Employment – Wrongful Termination – Pregnancy Discrimination

Appellant did not make a prima facie case of wrongful termination because there was no material fact dispute about causation, as required by the FMLA and the ADA.

We affirmed the ruling of the district court.

Appellant Annette Turner worked for Wal-Mart, beginning as a stocker in 2016. During her tenure, Turner suffered from neuropathy, asthma, and gestational hypertension (related to her pregnancy in 2019). Turner alleged that over the course of a few years, she was mistreated, both by Wal-Mart, and by her supervisors and colleagues. Turner sued Wal-Mart on various employment law theories. She brought eight claims in state court. First, pregnancy discrimination under Title VII. Second, for a hostile work environment under Title VII. Third, for failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Fourth, for wrongful termination under the ADA. Fifth, for a hostile work environment under the ADA. Sixth, for pregnancy discrimination under S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-30. Seventh, for retaliatory action under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). And eighth, for interference under the FMLA. The district court granted summary judgment for Wal-Mart in September 2023.

We began with Turner’s claims for wrongful termination under the ADA and for retaliatory termination under the FMLA. Both claims are governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. To bring a claim under the FMLA, McDonnell Douglas requires an employee to first make a prima facie showing “that he engaged in protected activity, that the employer took adverse action against him, and that the adverse action was causally connected to the plaintiff’s protected activity.” In the context of an ADA claim for wrongful termination, the prima facie showing requires an employee to demonstrate “that (1) he was a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was discharged; (3) he was fulfilling his employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of discharge; and (4) the circumstances of his discharge raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. Here the district court found that Turner did not make a prima facie case because there was no material fact dispute about causation. Because both her FMLA and ADA claims require a showing of causation, and because we agreed with the district court, her claims fail together.

Turner alleged she was fired for being pregnant, as well as for filing complaints. But we agreed with the district court that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that to be true. Turner learned of her pregnancy in early 2019. While she filed complaints and alleged mistreatment during her pregnancy, she was not fired during it. But immediately before she was fired, she missed three weeks of work without following the proper procedures to get leave. Not only does the length of the temporal gap suggest that the termination was not connected to her pregnancy and complaints, but proximity of Turner’s unapproved three-week absence undermines any plausible inference that she was fired for any reason other than her failure to show up for work. No reasonable factfinder could conclude that, months after filing complaints and months after giving birth, Turner was fired for those reasons rather than for skipping work three weeks in a row immediately before she was terminated.

Finally, Turner alleged pregnancy discrimination under Title VII. On appeal, she argued that “because the prima facie elements” of her hostile-work-environment claims are “parallel” to her pregnancy-discrimination claim, we should attribute her arguments against summary judgment with regards to the former claims to the latter claim. And because she alleged facts with regards to her hostile-work-environment claims, she argued that those facts create a genuine dispute of material fact as to her pregnancy-discrimination claim. But even if she is right, that means Turner’s pregnancy-discrimination claim rises and falls with her hostile-work-environment claims; having found that those fall, so too does her pregnancy-discrimination claim.

Affirmed.

Turner v. Wal-Mart Associates Inc. (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 003-026-25, 7 pp.) (Per Curiam) Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia (Donald C. Coggins, Jr., J.) ON BRIEF: David A. Nauheim, Joshua T. Mangan, NAUHEIM LAW OFFICE, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Kristin S. Gray, Spartanburg, South Carolina, Elizabeth M. Rodriguez, FORD & HARRISON LLP, Miami, Florida, for Appellees. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Unpublished