Criminal Practice – Juror Bias – Murder of Transgender Woman in Violation of Federal Hate Crimes Statute

The evidence was sufficient and the district court properly rejected claims of juror bias and trial error.

We affirmed Defendant’s convictions for murdering a transgender woman in violation of the federal hate crimes statute, using a firearm during a crime of violence, and lying to investigators.

Defendant was convicted of willfully causing bodily injury because of the victim’s gender identity, resulting in death, under 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2); using a firearm during that crime, under § 924(j)(1); and making false statements to law enforcement to hinder communication to federal authorities, under § 1512(b)(3). The evidence at trial showed that Defendant had a secret sexual relationship with the victim, a biological male who presented as female. Defendant was deeply concerned about others discovering the relationship, reacted angrily when confronted about it, and threatened violence. After the victim was found shot to death shortly after the two were last seen together, Defendant sought to dispose of his gun, burned his clothes, and lied to investigators about his whereabouts. A jury convicted him, and he received a life sentence.

On appeal, Defendant raised three principal arguments: juror bias, incurable hearsay prejudice, and insufficient evidence.

First, he argued that a juror, who disclosed during voir dire that she was transgender and later spoke to the press after the verdict, was biased. We rejected this claim, stressing the deference owed to the district court’s credibility determinations. The trial judge conducted a post-verdict evidentiary hearing and found the juror credible and impartial. Because appellate courts reverse such findings only for “manifest error,” and none was shown, we upheld the denial of a new trial.

Second, Defendant challenged the district court’s refusal to grant a mistrial after a witness improperly testified that Defendant’s uncle had “heard” Defendant killed the victim. The district court immediately issued a strong curative instruction directing the jury to disregard the hearsay. We held that juries are presumed to follow such instructions and that this brief, vague statement, later undermined through impeachment, did not rise to the level of uniquely prejudicial evidence requiring a mistrial.

Finally, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. As to the hate crime conviction, we held that “because of” in §249 incorporates traditional but-for causation. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational juror could conclude that Defendant would not have killed the victim but for the victim’s biological sex, a “gender-related characteristic,” given Defendant’s secrecy, anger, and differential treatment compared to his relationships with biological women.

As to the witness tampering conviction, we applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Fowler v. United States, holding that the government needed to show it was reasonably likely that truthful information would have reached federal officers. Given that the offense was federal in nature and that state and federal authorities shared information during the investigation, the evidence met that standard.

Affirmed.

U.S. v. Ritter (Lawyers Weekly No. 001-051-26, 16 pp.) (Julius N. Richardson, J.) Appealed from the U.S. District of South Carolina, at Aiken (Sherri A. Lydon, J.) ARGUED: Lindsey S. Vann, JUSTICE 360, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. David N. Goldman, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Harmeet K. Dhillon, Assistant Attorney General, Jesus A. Osete, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Andrew G. Braniff, Brant S. Levine, Appellate Section, Civil Rights, Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Bryan P. Stirling, United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, Benjamin N. Garner, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit