South Carolina Court of Appeals reverses summary judgment on tort claims act liability

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The South Carolina Tort Claims Act (TCA) does not bar a plaintiff from settling with a government employee in her individual capacity and then pursuing a separate negligence action against the governmental employer.

We reversed the grant of summary judgment and allowed Plaintiff’s claim against the State to proceed.

An action arose after Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the allegedly at-fault driver, Karen Campbell. Plaintiff settled with Campbell and recovered insurance policy limits, expressly preserving her right to pursue claims against other parties. She then filed suit against the State, alleging Campbell was acting within the scope of her employment and that the State was liable under the TCA.

The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s settlement with Campbell extinguished any derivative claim against the employer under section 15-78-70(d) of the TCA, which bars further actions arising from the same occurrence after a settlement or judgment. The circuit court agreed, relying on prior case law involving common law derivative liability principles, particularly the notion that releasing an employee releases an employer whose liability is purely vicarious.

On appeal, we rejected this reasoning and held that the controlling authority was the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in Wade v. Berkeley County. In Wade, the Supreme Court determined that the TCA’s bar applies only when there has been a settlement or judgment in an action brought under the TCA itself. Because Plaintiff’s initial settlement was with the employee individually, not in a TCA action against the government, the statutory bar did not apply.

The TCA is the exclusive remedy for torts committed by government employees acting within the scope of their duties and replaces common law doctrines such as respondeat superior in this context. As a result, traditional rules about derivative liability and release of one tortfeasor do not control TCA claims. The statute does not distinguish between joint and vicarious liability; instead, liability turns on whether the employee acted within the scope of employment.

Although allowing plaintiffs to settle with employees and then sue governmental employers may appear inconsistent with the TCA’s purpose of protecting employees from personal liability, the statutory language and legislative history compel this outcome.

Reversed.

Whetstone v. State of South Carolina (Lawyers Weekly No. 001-017-26, 6 pp.) (Kristi F. Curtis, J.) Appealed from Richland County Circuit Court (William A. McKinnon, J.) Mark D. Chappell and Mark Dale Chappell, Jr., and William S. Detwiler, of Chappell, Chappell & Newman, Attorneys, LLC, of Columbia, all for Appellant. David Allen Anderson, Carmen Vaughn Ganjehsani, and Hunter Weston Adams, all of Richardson Plowden & Robinson, PA, of Columbia; Thomas Ashley Limehouse, Jr., of Limehouse LLC, of Charleston; and William Grayson Lambert and Erica Wells Shedd, of Columbia, all for Respondent. South Carolina Court of Appeals