Civil Rights – Court Reinstates $2.3M Win for Pretrial Detainee

Listen to this article

Humbert v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City (Lawyers Weekly No. 001-164-17, 29 pp.) (Gregory, J.) No. 15-1768, Aug. 7, 2017; USDC at Baltimore, Md. (Quarles, J.) 4th Cir.

Holding: The 4th Circuit reverses a Maryland district court and reinstates plaintiff’s $2.3 million jury award against Baltimore police officers for violation of plaintiff’s civil rights in the use of questionable investigative strategies – including the officers’ failure to inform the state’s attorney that DNA reports excluded plaintiff as a sexual assault suspect and the victim could not positively identify him – that led to plaintiff’s unlawful arrest and detention in pretrial solitary confinement for nearly 15 months.

No Probable Cause

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court erred in determining that there was probable cause to support his seizure and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The victim had an emotional response to a photo of plaintiff shown by police, but stated she could not positively her assailant without a lineup and hearing his voice, which were never presented. She later agreed to testify based on officers’ false assertion that DNA evidence implicated plaintiff.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude the statement that the victim positively identified plaintiff as her attacker was false and the officers had an obvious reason to doubt its accuracy before including it in the warrant application. As such, the inclusion of this false statement amounts to at least recklessness.

The corrected warrant application would not have established probable cause to arrest plaintiff. It is clear that the probable cause supporting the officers’ application was based primarily, if not entirely, on the false assertion that the victim positively identified plaintiff.

The officers contend the victim’s initial response to plaintiff’s photo in the photobook constitutes the identification. But had the application shown that an officer partially caused the victim’s initial response by displaying plaintiff’s photo at the beginning of the investigation and identifying him as the attacker and shown that the victim was ultimately unable to positively identify plaintiff, that identification – the sole basis of probable cause – would have been negated.

Thus, the officers’ failure to mention these facts was reckless. No judicial officer employing the totality-of-the-circumstances approach would have issued the warrant simply because plaintiff resembled a sketch.

The warrant was invalid and could not support plaintiff’s seizure.

No Qualified Immunity

We cannot see how, under the circumstances of this case, the officers could have reasonably concluded that they had probable cause to arrest plaintiff. We conclude his arrest was not supported by probable cause.

Similarly, the legal process instituted against plaintiff and his resulting pretrial detention were unsupported by probable cause. The evidence shows the court commissioner made his probable cause determination by relying on a materially false and misleading warrant application.

During plaintiff’s 15-month detention, the officers never obtained any evidence of his criminality before or after his arraignment. To the contrary, the victim continuously informed them that she could not identify plaintiff. The officers received reports excluding plaintiff as a source of the DNA found on the victim and her clothing, yet they did not give the reports to the prosecutor until May 11, 2009, despite the prosecutor’s express demand on May 12, 2008, for immediate delivery of any and all information received by police in connection with the case.

We conclude the evidence reasonably supports the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.

Though the law was clearly established, the officers argue they acted reasonably by relying on the victim’s strong reaction to plaintiff’s photo and saying “that’s him” to constitute a positive identification. Any reasonable officer in these officers’ position would have doubted the reliability of the victim’s initial response one day after the attack, and attributed it, at least in part, to Officer Jones’ actions. We reverse the district court’s grant of qualified immunity and remand with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict as to this claim.

Lastly, because the district court wrongly held that the officers’ conduct did not amount to a constitutional violation, the court never confronted whether the municipal appellees violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. We vacate the court’s judgment for those appellees and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed in part, vacated in part and remanded with instructions.