Criminal Practice – Supervised Release – Oral Pronouncement – United States v. Rogers – Reporting Condition – Presentence Reports 

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The written judgment’s inclusion of the reporting condition dispelled any ambiguity in the district court’s oral pronouncement. 

Finding no error, we affirmed the judgment of the district court. 

Quinn Hakeem McCray pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court sentenced McCray to 180 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. On appeal, McCray argued the court erred under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), because it did not adequately announce the 13 standard conditions of supervised release at sentencing, and its oral pronouncement of the condition requiring McCray to report to the probation officer is inconsistent with the reporting condition in the written judgment. McCray also contended his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the court did not explain why it imposed the Sentencing Guidelines’ standard conditions and the probation officer, in the presentence report, suggested that the Guidelines’ standard conditions were mandatory. 

Because there were no other standard conditions of supervision to which the district court could have been referring in this case, the court sufficiently pronounced through incorporation the standard conditions in the Guidelines. Also, McCray failed to demonstrate a reversible inconsistency under Rogers. The court at the sentencing hearing orally pronounced through incorporation the standard conditions in USSG § 5D1.3(c), p.s., which included the condition that McCray report to the probation office in the district where he is authorized to reside, but also ordered McCray to report in the district to which he is released. Therefore, the court’s oral pronouncement itself was inconsistent, as it left ambiguous where McCray must report upon his release from custody. We are satisfied that the written judgment’s inclusion of the reporting condition in USSG § 5D1.3(c)(1), p.s., dispels the ambiguity in the district court’s oral pronouncement and confirms the court’s intent to require McCray to report to the probation office in the district where he is authorized to reside. 

Finally, we concluded that McCray has not shown plain error. Considering McCray’s significant and often violent criminal history, the court’s reasons for imposing the standard conditions of supervised release are self-evident. Further, the court provided an adequate explanation for the sentence, emphasizing the severity of McCray’s instant offense and criminal history while also recognizing his difficult upbringing and cognitive limitations. Lastly, while McCray’s presentence report did suggest that the standard conditions “will be ordered,” … “presentence reports do not have the force of law,” and there is no evidence the court believed the standard conditions were mandatory. We therefore discerned no procedural error in the court’s imposition of the standard conditions of supervised release. 

Affirmed. 

U.S. v. McCray (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 003-004-24, 7 pp.) (Per Curiam) Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina at Florence (R. Bryan Harwell, J.) On Brief: Kimberly H. Albro, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South Carolina, for appellant; Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, Tsering Jan Van Der Kuijp, Attorney Advisor, Office of the United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for appellee. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Unpublished