Tort/Negligence – Charitable Immunity – Intentional Torts

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South Carolina has never extended charitable immunity to cover intentional torts.

We reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court.

The question in this case was whether the doctrine of charitable immunity, which we abolished prospectively in Fitzer v. Greater Greenville S.C. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 277 S.C. 1, 4, 282 S.E.2d 230, 231– 32 (1981), shields Respondents, the Bishop of Charleston, a Corporation Sole, and the Bishop of the Diocese of Charleston, in his official capacity (collectively, the Diocese), from being sued for intentional torts that allegedly occurred in 1970. We concluded South Carolina has never extended charitable immunity to cover intentional torts.

Petitioner alleged numerous causes of action against the Diocese, including the intentional torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment, and civil conspiracy. The allegations arose from Petitioner’s claims that he was sexually assaulted by two of his teachers in 1970 while attending seventh grade at a school operated by the Diocese. Petitioner’s claims were not against the teachers or based on respondeat superior. Rather, he alleged the Diocese has direct, independent tort liability for certain conduct that caused his harm. He also claimed he suffers from a repressed memory condition that entitles him to toll the statute of limitations, though that issue was not before us. The circuit court granted the Diocese summary judgment, reasoning Petitioner could not recover because all of his claims were barred by the charitable immunity doctrine. The court of appeals agreed, concluding the doctrine, as it existed in 1970, immunized charities from all tort liability, including intentional torts.

Joining other states, South Carolina adopted charitable immunity in Lindler v. Columbia Hosp. of Richland Cnty., 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914). The doctrine was controversial even then. The doctrine arose in England in 1846. Before charitable immunity reached American shores, the House of Lords had killed it off in England. That did not stop us and most states from adopting it, justifying it on various grounds of public policy. Over time, logic and experience discredited all these grounds. By the time we decided Fitzer, the disfavored doctrine was beating a steady retreat from many jurisdictions.

With this history in mind, we moved to the dispositive issue: the state of charitable immunity in South Carolina as of 1970, the date of Petitioner’s alleged injury at the Diocese’s hands. The Diocese took the view that, as of 1970, charitable immunity extended to all torts, including intentional ones. This view can prevail only if we agree with the Diocese that our decision in Jeffcoat v. Caine, 261 S.C. 75, 198 S.E.2d 258 (1973), changed the law of charitable immunity by cutting back the reach of the doctrine to negligent torts only. Because Petitioner’s causes of action arose in 1970, before Jeffcoat was decided, the Diocese contended the doctrine as it existed in 1970 cloaks it with blanket immunity for all the torts Petitioner pleads. The court of appeals agreed with the Diocese. We disagreed. Justice Lewis, writing for the unanimous Court in Jeffcoat, was careful to explain the charitable immunity doctrine had never extended to intentional torts. Justice Lewis explained the idea that charitable immunity covered all torts was a mirage formed by the mists of dicta from certain decisions following Lindler. Jeffcoat did not change the law. It confirmed what the law had always been: that charitable immunity never extended to intentional torts. Nothing in our decisions in the half century since Jeffcoat shakes that judgment. The doctrine of charitable immunity therefore does not bar Petitioner’s intentional tort claims against the Diocese. We reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded Petitioner’s claims to the trial court.

Reversed and remanded.

Doe v. Bishop of Charleston, a Corporation Sole (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 010-071-25, 4 pp.) (D. Garrison Hill, J.) Appealed from Charleston County Circuit Court (Bentley Price, J.) Lawrence E. Richter, Jr., of The Richter Firm, LLC, and David K. Haller, of Haller Law Firm, both of Charleston; and James B. Richardson, Jr., of Columbia, all for Petitioner John Doe; Richard S. Dukes, Jr., of Turner Padget Graham & Laney, PA, of Charleston, and R. Hawthorne Barrett, of Turner Padget Graham & Laney, PA, of Columbia, both for Respondents. South Carolina Supreme Court