Criminal Practice – Law of Accident – Self Defense

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We found no reversible error in refusing to charge the law of accident but found reversible error in refusing to charge self-defense.

We reversed the court of appeals and remanded for a new trial.

Jason Edwin Stoots was convicted of second-degree domestic violence after an altercation with his wife, Kimberly. Stoots argued the trial court erred in refusing to charge the law of self-defense and accident. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction.

Stoots testified Kimberly was attacking him when he grabbed her arms to keep her from harming him. We agreed with Stoots the trial court was required to explain the law of self-defense to the jury. The State argued the trial court was correct not to charge self-defense because self-defense is an intentional act and Stoots testified he struck Kimberly with “no intent whatsoever.” The State asked us to focus only on Stoots’s claim the punch was unintentional and disregard his testimony that he was being attacked and he intentionally grabbed Kimberly’s arms to protect himself. We disagreed that this is the correct approach. If there is any evidence the defendant was acting in self-defense—which there was here—the trial court must charge it and let the jury sort out whether it believes the State’s version of events. The State certainly could have argued to the jury it should not find Stoots was entitled to self-defense because he testified he acted unintentionally, but it was for the jury to decide that question, not the trial court.

Both the trial court and the court of appeals determined a self-defense charge was not required because Stoots’s response was not proportional to Kimberly’s attack. We agreed with the courts that proportionality is a critical concern in all non-deadly force cases. Whether the defendant’s response was proportional, however, is almost always a jury question. Because whether self-defense applied—particularly the proportionality of Stoots’s response—was a question for the jury, it was error for the trial court and the court of appeals to rely on proportionality to justify the refusal to charge self-defense.

Stoots argued two of the traditional elements of self-defense are inapplicable or should be treated differently because he was responding with non-deadly force. Stoots argued he had a right to defend himself against the non-deadly blows from Kimberly even though he did not fear her attack would cause him serious bodily injury. We agreed with Stoots that it makes little sense to require a person to believe serious bodily injury is imminent before resorting to non-deadly force in self-defense. The law requires a person fear imminent serious harm or death before using deadly force to defend oneself because the use of defensive force is justified only to the extent such force is proportional to the threat the person faces. Where the provoking attack is less serious, a person may still be justified in responding, but only with proportional force. Thus, there is no requirement the defendant anticipate serious bodily injury or death before responding with non-deadly force in self-defense.

Next, Stoots argued there is no duty to retreat when responding with non-deadly force in self-defense. The trial court disagreed. We agreed with the State when it said at oral argument, “If somebody is attacked in their car it doesn’t make a whole lot of sense that we say you have to get out of your car in the drive-thru of Taco Bell and walk away.” To the extent the trial court found that Stoots was required to exit his own vehicle when his wife started hitting him in a fast-food drive-thru line instead of grabbing her arms to prevent his own injury, that was error.

Stoots also argued the trial court erred by not charging the jury on the law of accident because there was evidence that while Stoots was acting in self-defense he unintentionally struck Kimberly and caused her injury. Under the trial court’s correct charge that the State must prove “a mental state of conscious wrongdoing,” if Stoots did not intend to injure Kimberly he would be not guilty, and it would not matter whether he acted lawfully or with due care. The trial court’s jury charge on criminal intent squarely met the role that accident should play in this case, and there was no error. This is not to say that a narrower charge on the law of accident should not have been given in this case. As with self-defense, the trial court must tailor its jury instruction on the law of accident depending on the crime charged and the specific facts and circumstances of the case.

Reversed and remanded.

The State v. Jason Edwin Stoots (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 010-072-25, 10 pp.) (John C. Few, J.) Appealed from Greenville County Circuit Court (Alex Kinlaw, Jr., J.) Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of Columbia, for Petitioner; Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, of Columbia, for Respondent. South Carolina Supreme Court