Civil Practice – Dissolving a Mechanic’s Lien – Arbitration Award

The master-in-equity did not err in dissolving TCC of Charleston, Inc.’s mechanic’s lien based on its failure to serve the lien within 90 days of the last day of labor it provided in its statement of account.

We affirmed the master-in-equity’s order granting the Concord & Cumberland Horizontal Property Regime’s (HPR) motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, granted TCC’s motion to confirm the arbitration award, and denied TCC’s motions to amend statement of account and for attorney’s fees. We also affirmed the order granting summary judgment to Beatty. We reversed and remanded the award of attorney’s fees to the HPR and to Betty Beatty.

Among other things, TCC of Charleston, Inc. argued the subject mechanic’s lien was timely served and filed because the date of last work was January 23, 2017, not March 17, 2016, and that this was proven by evidence in the record. It contended the arbitration panel determined the last day of work was January 23, 2017, when it awarded damages for the stone tower, which was not completed on March 17, 2016. TCC maintained that the issue of the last day of work was res judicata because the circuit court allowed it to amend its initial pleadings to correct the date. TCC further contended this ruling became the law of the case and was binding on the master. TCC asserted an error in the date of last work on a statement of account was not a basis for invalidating a mechanic’s lien because the day of last work is not required for a statement of account. TCC argued timely service on the Concord & Cumberland Horizontal Property Regime (the HPR) constituted timely service on the unit owners and that the burden on the contractor to serve notice of a mechanic’s lien on owners who did not live at the property in question within 90 days of last work prevents a contractor from enforcing its lien rights. TCC asserted the master erred in preventing further discovery to determine how and when the unit owners first received notice of the mechanic’s lien and the lawsuit. We disagreed. The master did not err in dissolving TCC’s mechanic’s lien based on its failure to serve the lien within 90 days of the last day of labor it provided in its statement of account. In its initial complaint, first amended complaint, and statement of account, TCC stated the last day of work on the condominium occurred on March 17, 2016. While errors in the statement of account do not invalidate a lien, in this case the last day of work included in the initial complaint, first amended complaint, and statement of account show that TCC failed to serve its mechanic’s lien on the individual unit owners within ninety days of the last day of work on the project as the statute required. Although TCC amended its complaint a second time to remove reference to the last day of work as March 17, 2016, TCC is bound by the date of last work asserted in its statement of account. Moreover, TCC cannot assert that the last day of work occurred January 23, 2017—six months after it filed the mechanic’s lien in June 2016—because the party filing a mechanic’s lien asserts work that has already been performed. Additionally, the issue of the last day of work is not res judicata because the arbitration panel did not make any findings about the last day of work in its original or corrected award. The arbitration panel’s inclusion of the cost of the stone tower in its award did not include any discussion of the date of last work. Likewise, the master did not include any findings regarding the last day of work in its order allowing TCC to amend its pleadings. Thus, the issue of the last day of work has not been adjudicated in a previous action. Accordingly, we rejected TCC’s argument that the last day of work was res judicata. Further, service upon the HPR did not constitute service on the individual unit owners, such as Beatty.

TCC argued the master erred in holding the HPR’s payment of the judgment into the court halted the accrual of interest on the judgment because the contract between the parties provided for interests on late payments and depositing funds into court does not stop contractual interest. It contended the panel did not err in holding TCC to be the prevailing party in arbitration and that the panel’s holding bound the HPR. We agreed. The master erred in finding that the HPR’s deposit of the arbitration award into the court would stop interest from accruing pursuant to Rule 67, SCRCP.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded.

TCC of Charleston Inc. v. Concord and Cumberland LLC (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 011-014-25, 25 pp.) (Jerry D. Vinson Jr., J.) Appealed from Charleston County (Mikell R. Scarborough, Master-in-Equity) Jaan Gunnar Rannik, of Epting & Rannik, LLC; and Michelle N. Endemann, both of Charleston, for TCC of Charleston, Inc.; F. Cordes Ford, IV, of Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, of Charleston, for Concord and Cumberland, LLC; Leo Hall; Diane Hall; Bea H. Smith; Margaret C. Pope; William D. Foster; Jr., Donald D. Leonard; Mattellen, LLC; Thomas R. Debnam; Gregory J. Gardner; Freeman Waterfront Properties, LLC; Jo-Ann Cooper; Betty Y. Segal; Robert M. Levin; Bonita K. Levin; Robert Kenneth Seidl, II; M. Bert Storey; Thomas R. Mather; 304 Concord & Cumberland, LLC; Marion M. Simpson; Kathy Gardner; Edward T. Strom; Barbara K. Henderson; James R. Clarke; Paul A. Brim; Robert K. Seidl; Jennifer M. Seidl; Gene G. Foster; Mattison J. MacGillivray; Teresa MacGillivray; Pamela L. Vaughn; Nelia A. Patricio; and Stuart D. Reeves; Robert Andrew Walden, of Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, of Charleston, for Concord and Cumberland HPR; William Cole Shannon, of Charleston; Edward D. Buckley, Jr. and Russell Grainger Hines, of Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston; all for Betty L. Beatty; W. Siau Barr, Jr., of Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston, for 304 Concord & Cumberland, LLC and Betty L. Beatty. South Carolina Court of Appeals