Attorneys – Agreement for Discipline by Consent – Retroactive to Date of Interim Suspension

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Respondent is disbarred based on eight disciplinary complaints over fee disputes, failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, misconduct, and failure to pay a process server.

Disbarred.

In this attorney disciplinary matter, Respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent (the Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. In the Agreement, Respondent admits misconduct and consents to disbarment and requests that disbarment be retroactive to his September 27, 2019, interim suspension. The Commission on Lawyer Conduct unanimously recommended that the Agreement be accepted and Respondent be disbarred, but not retroactive to the date of interim suspension.

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in 2001. Respondent’s disciplinary history includes a 2009 one-year definite suspension for misconduct regarding a real estate purchase transaction1 and a 2011 ninety-day definite suspension for issuing a check drawn from a law firm trust account with insufficient funds. In 2013, this Court reinstated Respondent to the practice of law upon various conditions.

This Agreement involves eight disciplinary complaints. In the first complaint, Respondent failed to pay the full amount owed in a fee dispute. The second complaint involves Respondent’s failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. The third complaint involves Respondent’s failure to pay the amount owed in a fee dispute. The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh complaints involve Respondent’s misconduct in the representation of numerous heirs in an heirs’ property action. The eighth complaint involves Respondent’s failure to pay a process server. On September 27, 2019, Respondent was placed on interim suspension after he failed to cooperate with the investigation of these complaints pending against him before ODC.

Respondent admits his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.3 (providing a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing client); Rule 1.15 (prohibiting a lawyer from disbursing funds from an account containing funds of more than one client or third person unless the funds to be disbursed have been deposited in the account and are collected funds); Rule 8.1(b) (prohibiting willful failure to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority); Rule 8.4(a) (prohibiting violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct); Rule 8.4(d) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Rule 8.4(e) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Respondent further admits his conduct constitutes grounds for discipline under the following Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR: Rule 7(a)(1) (prohibiting, among other things, violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct); Rule 7(a)(3) (prohibiting willful failure to respond to a lawful demand from a disciplinary authority to include a request for a response or appearance); Rule 7(a)(5) (prohibiting conduct demonstrating an unfitness to practice law); and Rule 7(a)(10) (prohibiting willful failure to comply with a final decision of the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board).

We accepted the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and disbarred Respondent from the practice of law in this state. We declined to make the disbarment retroactive to the date of Respondent’s interim suspension.

Disbarred.

In the Matter of Louis S. Moore (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 010-031-25, 4 pp.) (Per Curiam) Disciplinary Counsel William M. Blitch, Jr. and Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Connor J. Parker, both of Columbia, for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel; John A. Massalon, of Wills Massalon & Allen LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent. South Carolina Supreme Court