Civil Practice – Monetary Sanctions – Jury Trial Demand

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The circuit court did not err in striking Appellants’ counterclaims and awarding monetary sanctions.

We affirmed the order of the circuit court.

Appellants appealed the circuit court’s order granting Respondent’s motions to strike and for a rule to show cause. On appeal, Appellants argued the circuit court erred in (1) striking their counterclaims and awarding sanctions, and (2) striking their jury trial request.

Appellants argued the circuit court erred in striking their counterclaims and awarding monetary sanctions. We disagreed. We found the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Respondent’s motion to show cause and striking Appellants’ counterclaims and sanctioning Appellants $2,500 because Appellants’ actions demonstrated bad faith, willful disobedience, and gross indifference to Respondent’s rights. Appellants had ample opportunity to comply with Respondent’s discovery requests, the circuit court’s order to compel, and instructions at the motion to show cause hearing, but they failed to do so. Appellants’—a lawyer and his law firm’s—consistent failure over the course of almost one year to adequately comply with Respondent’s discovery requests and the circuit court’s orders shows Appellants acted in bad faith, willful disobedience, and gross indifference to Respondent’s rights; thus, the striking of their counterclaims and awarding $2,500 to Respondent was warranted because Appellants were warned of the repercussions of noncompliance but still failed to comply with the circuit court’s specific instructions.

Appellants also argued the circuit court erred by granting Respondent’s motion to strike Appellants’ jury trial demand because “the circuit court did not provide any factual support or legal analysis for its decision to strike.” Appellants argued the counterclaims were compulsory; thus, the waiver was unenforceable because they would not be able to bring them later in a separate action. Further, they asserted that even though the lease agreement in question contained a waiver of the right to a jury trial, they are entitled to a jury trial because Respondent’s amended complaint demanded one and therefore Respondent waived the terms of the lease. We disagreed. We found the circuit court did not err in granting Respondent’s motion to strike the jury trial demand because both Respondent and Appellants waived the right to a jury trial when the parties signed the commercial lease, which contained clear and unambiguous terms regarding the waiver of a jury trial. We acknowledged Respondent demanded a jury trial in its amended pleadings; however, the parties never mutually consented to retract the plain and unambiguous language of the waiver provision.

Affirmed.

Roi Tan Enterprises LLV v. Anastopoulo (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 012-069-25, 3 pp.) (Per Curiam) Appealed from Charleston County Circuit Court (Bentley Price, J.) Lane Douglas Jefferies and Eric Marc Poulin, both of Poulin, Willey, Anastopoulo, LLC, of Charleston, for Appellants. Arthur Cole Pelzer, of Pelzer Law Firm, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent. South Carolina Court of Appeals Unpublished