Civil Practice – Jurisdiction – Section 38-5-70 of the South Carolina Code 

Section 38-5-70 of the South Carolina Code does not confer general jurisdiction over Chicago Title Insurance Company upon the courts of this state.

We affirmed the circuit court’s order granting Chicago Title’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Appellant alleged causes of action against Chicago Land Agency Title Services (CLAS), Inc. and Chicago Title for negligence, quiet title, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, slander of title, and civil conspiracy. Appellant asserted CLAS and Chicago Title were engaged in a joint venture and therefore the actions of CLAS were attributable to Chicago Title. She alleged CLAS, Chicago Title, or both were negligent in recording a fraudulent deed.

Chicago Title moved to dismiss the claims against it under Rule 12(b)(2), SCRCP, for lack of personal jurisdiction. Chicago Title, a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Florida, argued South Carolina courts had no general jurisdiction over it because it was not “at home” in South Carolina. In addition, it argued that specific jurisdiction did not exist because it did not direct any suit-related activities towards South Carolina; it was not a joint venture partnership with CLAS because Chicago Title was a shareholder of CLAS and both were corporate entities and therefore could not be in a joint venture; and Appellant made no allegations that Chicago Title was an alter ego of CLAS. The circuit court granted Chicago Title’s motion, concluding it lacked both general and specific jurisdiction over Chicago Title. It determined compliance with section 38-5-70 was not sufficient to confer general jurisdiction without establishing Chicago Title had sufficient minimum contacts in this state, as required under International Shoe and Daimler.

Appellant argued Chicago Title’s licensure under section 38-5-70 as a foreign insurer in South Carolina allows courts of this state to exercise general jurisdiction over it. We disagreed. We held section 38-5-70 did not confer general jurisdiction over Chicago Title upon the courts of this state because (1) the statute does not expressly indicate that by appointing the Director as its attorney for service of process, the insurer also consents to the jurisdiction of the state and (2) our state courts have not interpreted this statute as imposing such a condition. We concluded our appellate courts have not interpreted section 38-5-70 as providing that an insurer, solely by complying with the statute’s requirement that it appoint the Director as its agent for service of process, has subjected itself to this state’s general jurisdiction. Because section 38-5-70 does not expressly provide that the insurer by complying with the statute agrees to be subject to the general jurisdiction of South Carolina courts and because our appellate courts have not interpreted the statute to confer jurisdiction, the circuit court did not err by finding it lacked general jurisdiction over Chicago Title.

Affirmed.

Ormand-Ward v. Litt (Lawyers’ Weekly No. 011-037-25, 17 pp.) (Jerry D. Vinson Jr., J.) Appealed from Horry County Circuit Court (Michael G. Nettles, J.) John M. Leiter, of Law Offices of John M. Leiter, PA, of Myrtle Beach, for Appellant. Denny Parker Major, of Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, PA, of Columbia, for Respondent. South Carolina Court of Appeals