Criminal Practice – Protection of Persons and Property Act – Immunity from Prosecution

The court of appeals erred in finding Respondent was entitled to an entirely new, second immunity hearing under the Protection of Persons and Property Act following the mistrial.

We reversed the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the court of appeals to decide the two remaining issues on appeal.

We addressed whether a criminal defendant is entitled to a second immunity hearing under the Protection of Persons and Property Act following a mistrial. Respondent was charged with murder for stabbing the victim after an altercation between rival high school fans. Respondent claimed self-defense, seeking immunity from prosecution under the Act, which grants immunity to those justified in using deadly force, determined through a pre-trial immunity hearing.

At the initial pre-trial immunity hearing, the State presented evidence that Respondent had instigated a confrontation by luring rival fans to a restaurant, then driving aggressively toward them, and eventually stabbing the victim. Respondent’s testimony portrayed the act as self-defense: he claimed the victim and others were reaching into his vehicle, prompting him to act. The circuit court denied immunity, finding Respondent failed to prove that the victim unlawfully entered his vehicle, that he reasonably feared imminent harm, or that he was without fault in provoking the situation. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury deadlocked, resulting in a mistrial.

Following the mistrial, Respondent requested a second immunity hearing to present new evidence developed during the first trial. The trial court denied the request, allowing the retrial to proceed, where Respondent was convicted. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, holding a mistrial nullified prior proceedings, including immunity rulings, and therefore Respondent was entitled to a second immunity hearing.

We reversed the court of appeals, holding that a mistrial does not entitle a defendant to a second immunity hearing. We distinguished between pre-trial rulings tied to trial mechanics, such as evidentiary rulings, which must be revisited after a mistrial, and rulings that are independent of trial conduct, like immunity hearings. Immunity hearings serve solely to determine whether prosecution is barred; they do not dictate trial procedure or the presentation of evidence, and a denial does not prevent the defendant from asserting self-defense at trial. Accordingly, the original immunity ruling remains binding even after a mistrial.

We also upheld the merits of the initial denial of immunity. Under the Act, a defendant bears the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. To qualify, Respondent needed to demonstrate that he was without fault, reasonably believed he faced imminent danger of death or serious injury, a reasonable person would share that belief, and no alternative means of avoiding the danger existed. The record, including witness testimony and video evidence, supported the circuit court’s conclusion that Respondent provoked the confrontation, used deadly force without sufficient justification, and could have avoided the danger.

Reversed and remanded.

The State v. Dennis (Lawyers Weekly No. 010-005-26, 13 pp.) (John W. Kittredge, J.) Appealed from Lexington County Circuit Court (Eugene C. Griffith Jr., J.) Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Senior Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of Columbia, for Petitioner. Senior Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for Respondent. South Carolina Supreme Court