Criminal Practice – Delayed Trial as Adult for Juvenile Offense

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U.S. v. Lopez (Lawyers Weekly No. 001-138-17, 29 pp.) (Harris, J.) No. 15-4573, June 19, 2017; USDC at Greenbelt, Md. (Grimm, J.) 4th Cir.

Holding: A defendant who was 17 years old when he and another young man robbed a brothel, raping one victim and killing another, was properly tried as an adult when he was charged six years later after DNA testing identified him as a suspect; the 4th Circuit affirms defendant’ conviction under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), the federal robbery statute.

Delayed Prosecution

At defendant’s trial, one of the government’s key witnesses was a confidential informant who had been incarcerated with defendant in 2007. The informant told the jury he overheard a conversation between his cellmate, an MS-13 gang member, and defendant, in which defendant boasted about committing a robbery and murder at a brothel. He testified that the MS-13 gang enforced strict rules against its members and treated cooperation with law enforcement as punishable by death. The government also introduced the DNA evidence linking defendant to the knife sheath from the bedroom where the rape occurred.

On appeal, defendant argues that because he was under 18 when the robbery was committed, he should have been tried as a juvenile notwithstanding the passage of time before his indictment, and that to the extent the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), 18 U.S.C. § 5031, provides otherwise, it is unconstitutional. Defendant also argues that his prosecution was untimely under the ordinary five-year statute of limitations for a Hobbs Act robbery, and that 18 U.S.C § 3297, which extends the limitations period in certain cases involving DNA testing, does not apply. Finally, he claims the government violated his due process rights by delaying his indictment without justification.

Statutory Purpose

The JDA is intended to ensure that, at the time they are brought into the criminal justice process, juveniles will have the benefit of a system that is tailored to their special needs and vulnerabilities and special receptivity to rehabilitation. It is entirely rational to define as juveniles protected by the JDA only those who are younger than 21 when they are indicted, regardless of the age at which they are alleged to have committed their offenses. There is nothing irrational about Congress’ decision, codified in § 5031, to reserve the protections of the juvenile justice system for offenders who enter it before they turn 21.

Defendant fares no better by reframing his argument as a due process claim that § 5031 unconstitutionally deprives him of a hearing on whether he may be tried as an adult. We agree with the 2nd Circuit, which rejected precisely this due process challenge in U.S. v. Hoo, 825 F. 2d 667 (2nd Cir. 1987). Nor is there merit to defendant’s claim that § 5031 violates the Eighth Amendment.

Further, we agree with the district court that the six-year gap between the 2007 robbery and defendant’s 2013 prosecution does not run afoul of the five-year statute of limitations for Hobbs Act prosecutions. Section 3297, 18 U.S.C., applies to extend the limitations period in this case involving DNA testing. We agree with U.S. v. Hagler, 700 F.3d 1091 (7th Cir. 2012), that the new limitations period is triggered when “DNA testing implicates an identified person” in a felony, not when it could implicate a person. Here, it is clear that DNA testing implicated defendant only in 2012, when he was linked to the DNA sample taken from the knife sheath.

There was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of the Hobbs Act offense, as a reasonable jury could find that robbery of the brothel would have at least a de minimis effect on interstate commerce – and, aggregated with other similar acts, a measurable impact on commerce.

Conviction and 20-year sentence are affirmed.