Criminal Practice — Habeas Claims Raised in Magistrate Objections

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As an initial matter, we hold today that U.S. v. George, 971 F.2d 1113 (4th Cir. 1992), applies in the context of habeas corpus cases, contrary to the district court’s holding. This leads to a secondary issue – how George is applied in the habeas context.

The decision in George turned on the interpretation of the Federal Magistrates Act – specifically 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and the requirement that a district judge make a de novo determination to sections of a proposed findings and recommendations (PF&R) to which a party objects. The PF&R submitted with respect to either pretrial suppression of evidence or post-trial relief by a prisoner is subject to a de novo determination by the district judge. The language of the statute is also reflected in the language of Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts.

As precedent of this court, our holding in George must apply absent an en banc overruling or a suspending contrary decision of the Supreme Court. Because neither of these events has occurred, we find that George does apply to habeas cases.

Applying the George framework to a habeas petition, we find the following three levels: 1) the legal case is the habeas petition; 2) the issues or claims are the asserted grounds for relief; and 3) the arguments are whatever position is taken in support of or against each asserted ground for relief.

The statutes governing habeas petitions themselves refer to each basis for which the petitioner’s custody may be illegal as a separate claim. Supreme Court case law indicates that different grounds for relief are treated as different claims. We do not believe that an “issue” as referred to in George can be defined at the high level of generality petitioner urges us to apply here. Rather, an issue in the habeas context is a ground for relief, and “arguments” are the legal positions related to the ground for relief. In this case, however, petitioner seeks to assert a new claim, not to make an argument with respect to an existing claim.

Petitioner’s Objections

Having found that George can meaningfully apply in the habeas context, we now review the district court’s analysis of petitioner’s objections. Although the district court appeared to indicate it believed George did not apply, the court’s actual analysis of petitioner’s objections comports with the understanding of George we have explained.  We therefore find no error in how the district court disposed of the objections.

In his pro se objections, petitioner appears to make a freestanding claim of ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel and argue that the “six acts of omission” by his trial counsel – which all agree are not actually included in the 2014 petition anywhere – should be considered by the district court as grounds for relief. Both of these are new grounds for relief and under George, that makes them new “issues” and not new “arguments” related to issues contained within the 2014 petition. Under George, there was no obligation for the district court to hear either of the new claims petitioner made in his objections to the PF&R.

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to hear petitioner’s claims made in his objections to the PF&R.

Judgment affirmed.